I ”Möten i rondellen” (DN ledare 30/9) summerar Niklas Ekdal tesen att Lars Vilks utspel är att betraktas som barnsligt, provocerande, farlig, men dessutom som ”nödvändig”. Det förefaller nästan logiskt att hålla med tesen, i fall Niklas Ekdal med det menar att det är nödvändigt - med hjälp av diverse intelektuella incitament - att hålla en kontinuerlig analys beträffande religionens roll i samhället, nödvändigt att vakta fanatismfaran, nödvändigt att studera på vilket sätt brister i integrationspolitiken är också en del av faran. Likaså den delvis kulturella, delvis politiskt betingade ovilja vissa invandrare tycks ha att acceptera exilsamhällets normer i allmänhet, etc.
Emellertid, det som i min mening inte är nödvändigt alls är att för ändamålet ovan välkomma den ”kulturella” existensen av det främlingsfientliga agerande Lars Vilks representerar. För utöver det vulgära, det obehagliga, det oestetiska, det oetiska, o.s.v. som dessa kulturella huliganer tillbringar med sina karikatyrklichéer, står det enorm fara i de svar som provoceras fram.
Det avsiktligt provocerade svaret är dessutom inte episodiskt, eller endast igenkänd av mängd byggnader och svenska flaggor nedbränd och förstörda. Det svaret kan leva vidare i talrika latenta former hos den befolkningen vilken själ föremjukas. Tyvärr.
I det Niklas Ekdal onekligen har rätt, är att denna rondellhunden diskussion är inget annat än en repris på debatten efter de danska Muhammedkarikatyrerna 2005. Allt är redan bekant och förutserbar. Just på denna grund var Lars Vilks givetvis fullt medveten om konsekvenserna av sitt hugg bland fattiga muslimer världen över. Alltsammnas är dessutom en politisk fråga, som Jan Guillou problematiserade i Statsministern stryker den rasistiska opinionen medhårs (Aftonbladet 5/2 2006), och inte primärt en item för konstens eller yttrandefrihet endast.
Foto: K.M. Chaudary /AB
Mitt förslag är att den som medvetet orsakar en sådan kollektiv reaktion som består av direkt fara samt förstörelse av svensk ellers andras egendom, nationella symboler, etc. utomlands, skall ses av lagen som den intellektuell ansvarige för bl.a. den materiella kostnaden, och ansvarig för de ev. människoliv som spills samt de skador som tillfogas i samband med dessa protester. Således den ansvarige borde ställas inför rätta vid svenska domstolen och betala skadestånd. Alltså lagen om yttrandefrihet borde revideras/kompletteras.Därtill tycker jag att Lars Vilks borde betala med egna resurser till den svenska staten för den skydd Säpo ställer upp.
Detta nedanför summera min tes, som i full text publicerades här i februari 2006:
Making compatibles Freedom of Speech and banning of uttered offences.
What to do
The core of the problem is not what we can say or write, what we are allowed to say or write, according to the Freedom of Speech. The crux is whether - in the moment of that saying or writing - we are fully aware of the consequences not only upon the integrity of others, but also of the collateral damage for others, caused by those reactions. If we consciously infringe that principle, we are accounted for malicious intent, and thus, as intellectual instigators of the disaster.
For this there is no law. But we could have one.
Laws, as such, are characterized by their coercion potential. This is the feature that differentiates law postulates from moral postulates. A moral principle can be infringed without the individual expecting a juridical-based punishment, such as prison. The one breaking a law has always to expect the coercion (the penalty) entailed in that breaking. Penalty is embedded in the law, could we simply say.
This law should have a possibility of enforcement such as in the following illustration. If I know, if I am well aware, that by publishing this verse I would cause inevitably a reaction which put in danger the life of my own people abroad, the onus probandis (in the sense of penalty potential) is not to be found in what I am publishing (since for it I am allowed by the law Freedom of Speech), but in the magnitude of the consequences I will accounted for because (and if) that consequences were to a significant extent due to my publishing.
The degree of "significant extent" is not that difficult to assess with help of causality criteria, examination of confounding factors, etc., and in general with tools of that kind we use - or at least we are suppose to use - in epidemiological research settings (in fact, many "emergent" epidemiological phenomena, such "burn-out", base much of its popularity in the absence of those tests of causality criteria. See here).
You may ask how I will know in advance of that particular consequence. The answer is not complicated, although dialectical. Here follow some criteria, although only Nr 3 criteria may have juridical relevancy
First, you may use your common sense.
Second, you have the Kantian principle of abstaining of behaviours you would not accept infringed against yourself or against your own society, or system of believes.
Third, and here the aggravating potential could be found, if a similar act (similar to your publishing) has recently resulted in repetitive and similar consequences.
Breaking-down:
If, a) a similar act b) has recently c) resulted in repetitive d) and similar consequences
a) The penal scale goes after the degree of correspondence. In this case, an equal content of the publishing, the re-publishing of the same graphic etc., scores highest in the scale.
b) The penal scale goes from recently to longer back in time. For time can change response behaviours due to socio-historical accounts.
c) The penal scale goes after the replication frequency of the response. The more repeated the response, the obvious that your publishing will evoce response.
d) The penal scale goes after the degree of intensity or amplitud in the "epidemiology" of the similar response.
Of course that all above, solely in case basic ethical principles have not naturally already intervened in your reasoning, long before this process, and advised you the right path. This is what I deem has happened with most of the Swedish newspapers and media regarding the issue of publishing or not the infamous cartoons. They just simply abstained by their own ethics and common sense, even if they had the full legal right to publish the material.
In other words what here is suggested it is a changing of a cultural praxis through legal mechanisms. Changing towards the behaviour of ourselves taking the responsibility for what ourselves say or write.
What is the accepted common praxis in Sweden? People can say things, insult, behave verbally in a very aggressive or nasty way without expecting consequences. If you in Sweden react like in other countries such as in the USA - where “giving one light punch” to the offender is a response for many regarded as “culturally” accepted- you can go to jail. If you react by saying sharp “do not do this again or take the consequences”, in Sweden that saying will be automatically regarded as a “warning”, which can easily be interpreted as olaga hot (unlawful threat) and therefore juridical liable. You can get jail in other words. Not to mention what it would happen if you use some violence against a thief breaking “quietly” in your house in the middle of a night and robe you everything. You may get prison for years.
Coming back to our central issue. The impact and dimension of such behaviours (the "allowed by the law" insulting other cultures or religious groups) in the international arena – particularly those with a background of severe conflicts and wars - entail much aggravating consequences.
First, because those costs are huge collectively sensed by the nation affected
Second, because the retaliation of international multitudes is exercised against the all society from which the “innocent” offence, even if individually designed, did departure. This is an unfair consequence, but a very real one.
This is the case of the recent boycott to the Danish Arla. The same type of feared measure against Volvo, Ericsson, Ikea, etc, was averted by a one-time decision seemingly taken in Sweden by cleaver officials at the Secret Police (the “invitation” of closing the SD website containing republishing of the cartoons). What now it needs to be done is to find a juridical instrument for an all-time praxis in order to avert these dangerous potentials.
Concluding
In my opinion, it is entirely possible to make compatibles Freedom of Speech and banning of uttered offences
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